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ABSTRACT
Jaspers’s binary distinction between understanding 
and explanation has given way fi rst to a proliferation 
of explanatory levels and now, in John Campbell’s 
recent work, to a conception of explanation with 
no distinct levels of explanation and no inbuilt 
rationality requirement. I argue that there is still a 
role for understanding in psychiatry and that is to 
demystify the assumption that the states it concerns 
are mental. ? is role can be fulfi lled by placing 
rationality at the heart of understanding without 
a commitment to the attempt to use rationality 
to shed light on interpretation and mindedness 
as though from outside those notions. Delusions 
still present a signifi cant challenge to philosophical 
attempts at understanding, but this merely refl ects 
the genuine clinical diffi  culties such states present.
Keywords: John Campbell, interventionism, nor-
mativity, understanding, Ludwig Wittgenstein
1. Levels of explanation in the history 
of psychiatry
A century ago, Karl Jaspers, infl uenced by 
the long running Methodenstreit, argued 
that explanation in psychiatry should be 
complemented by understanding. He 
was not hostile to explanation but, at a 
time when recent advances in neurology 
had led psychiatry to be dominated by 
what Jaspers called ‘brain mythologists’, 
he wished to balance that natural science 
emphasis with a human science element.
Jaspers’s distinction is epistemic rather 
than ontological. Understanding and 
explanation do not have two distinct 
subject matters but diff er in the method 
or the kind of intelligibility that they 
deploy. As applied in psychiatry, they 
share the same subject matter: ‘real 
events’ or ‘thought processes’, which can 
in principle be charted in either way.
? e suggestive assumption 
that the psychic is the area of 
meaningful understanding 
and the physical that of causal 
explanation is wrong. ? ere is 
no real event, be it physical or 
of psychic nature, which is not 
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accessible to causal explanation… 
? e eff ect a psychic state may have could in principle lend itself to 
a causal explanation, while the psychic state itself of course must be 
phenomenologically (statically) understood. It is not absurd to think 
that it might one day be possible to have some rules which could causally 
explain the sequence of meaningfully connected thought processes 
without paying heed to the meaningful connections between them …
It is therefore in principle not at all absurd to try to understand as well 
as to explain one and the same real psychic event. ? ese two established 
connections, however, are of entirely diff erent kinds of validity. (Jaspers 
1974, 86)
Whilst explicitly contrasting explanation and understanding has fallen out of fashion, 
a distinction akin to Jaspers’s remains infl uential in some philosophical circles. 
Wilfrid Sellars distinguishes what he calls the ‘manifest image of man in the world’ 
from the scientifi c image (Sellars 1963, 6). Donald Davidson argues that the mental 
is governed by the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’ which has ‘no echo in physical 
theory’ (Davidson 1980; 223, 231). Building on Sellars’s work, John McDowell 
contrasts the logical space of reasons with the realm of law or of natural science 
(McDowell 1994). 
Whilst these distinctions are less clearly epistemological than Jaspers’s, they 
are essentially tied to an epistemological distinction. ? e ‘manifest image’, the 
‘constitutive ideal of rationality’ and the ‘space of reasons’ are all characterised in 
normative terms. And thus all are subject to a particular kind of intelligibility which 
can, for convenience be mapped onto the understanding side of the distinction 
between understanding and explanation. Understanding depends on a comparison 
with an ideal whilst explanation does not. According to a broadly Hempelian 
model, explanation depends on subsumption under a generalisation. According to 
a more recent interventionist view (see below), it depends on stable possibilities of 
intervention. But, however explanation is construed, it has a diff erent kind of logic 
from understanding: paradigmatically how things usually happen, rather than how 
they ought to happen.
In psychiatry, there is an important further way in which normative understanding 
may play a central role. If the very idea of an illness, disease or disorder is a normative 
notion and if this cannot be reduced to more basic non-normative notions then 
assessing a subject’s condition will also involve something like comparison to an 
ideal. But given that there are ongoing attempts to reduce the concept of disorder, at 
least, to failure of biological function itself construed as discharging any unexplained 
normative notions, this is a more contentious case (Wakefi eld 1999).
Whilst the fi rm distinction between normative and non-normative remains infl uential 
in some quarters, it is less so in much contemporary philosophy of psychiatry. ? ere 
are two key indications of this. ? e fi rst is that Jaspers’s duality of understanding 
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and explanation has been replaced by a multiplicity of explanatory levels or kinds of 
approach. In his introduction to the philosophy of psychology, José Bermúdez takes 
the key challenge for this area of philosophy to be the relation between a number of 
diff erent levels of explanation:
commonsense psychological explanation ... explanations of cognition and 
mental operations given scientifi c psychology, cognitive science, cognitive 
neuroscience and the other levels in the explanatory hierarchy (Bermúdez 
2005, 35)
More specifi c to psychiatric explanation, Dominic Murphy, for example, has recently 
attempted to show how Marr’s threefold distinction between levels can be applied to 
psychiatric explanation. Marr’s threefold distinction is between: 
Computational theory: What is the goal of the computation, why is it 
appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by which it can be carried out? 
Representation and algorithm: How can this computational theory 
be implemented? In particular, what is the representation for the 
input and output, and what is the algorithm for the transformation?  
Hardware implementation: How can the representation and algorithm be 
realized physically? (Marr 1982, 25)
Murphy points out that Marr thinks of the levels in epistemic terms: as diff erent 
ways of understanding the same system. One can determine its goals, the algorithm 
by which it determines those goals or the physical set up which implements that 
algorithm. But one might think of them as describing distinct forms of organisation 
in nature or distinct causal structures pitched at diff erent ontological levels: ‘higher 
levels are made up of lower level things, and at each level things interact with each 
other rather than with things at lower levels’ (Murphy 2008, 10). 
In psychiatry, however, neither of these pictures is quite right, according to Murphy, 
because there are diff erent systems operating at diff erent levels, unlike the epistemic 
view, but the diff erent levels interact, unlike the latter view. ? us whilst Marr’s 
description of levels suggest that they are partly independent (the computational 
level constrains but does not determine the causal mechanisms that implements it), 
Murphy suggests that in psychiatry causes described at one level will have eff ects at 
another so that useful generalisations will cross levels.
? e replacement of an opposition between Jaspers’s two levels with a proliferation 
is merely the fi rst of three steps that have reduced the role of understanding in 
psychiatry. ? e second is the pragmatic attitude to switching between levels described 
by Murphy. Indeed, the dominant view is that ‘most explanations in psychiatry will 
end up being cross levels rather than solely within levels’ (Kendler and Parnas 2008, 
100). But the third step is, I suggest, provided by a series of articles by John Campbell 
in which he both argues against the very idea that there are levels of explanation but 
also that the model of causal explanation that remains has no need of intelligibility.
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2. Campbell on causation and explanation in psychiatry
Campbell argues that the multi-level model of explanation in psychiatry results from 
a pre-Humean assumption about the intelligibility of relations tracked in causal 
explanation. He gives, as an example, a discussion of thought insertion by Christopher 
Frith. Frith claims that whether or not inappropriate fi rings of dopamine neurons 
are found in subjects who experience thought insertion, that fact cannot be used to 
explain their experiences as it would shed no light on why that kind of symptom, 
rather than another, was produced by such fi ring. To shed light, Frith assumes, we 
need an account pitched at a particular level: in Frith’s case that of a sub-personal but 
still cognitive model of mechanisms supposedly responsible for thought insertion.
Campbell suggests that the assumption that there is a right level of explanation which 
clarifi es things in the way Frith desires is the result of a pre-Humean view of causal 
explanation. Although it is easily forgotten, Hume taught us that there need be no 
intelligible connection between cause and eff ect. ? at is implicit in his rejection of 
any logical connection to analyse the necessitating relation between them. Causal 
connections are merely brute facts to be discovered by experience. 
Resisting the idea that the right kind of cause and eff ect have to be intelligibly, rather 
than merely brutely, related also undercuts the motivation for the levels of explanation 
picture.
We naturally seek a certain kind of intelligibility in nature; we naturally try 
to fi nd explanations that will show the world to conform to reason, to behave 
as it ought. Hume’s point is that there are no such intelligible connections 
to be found. ? is point has generally been accepted by philosophers 
thinking about causation... Hume’s comments nonetheless do leave us in 
an uncomfortable position, because we do tend to look for explanations 
that make the phenomena intelligible to reason. We are prone to relapse, 
to think that after all we must be able to fi nd intelligibility in the world. 
? is tendency survives, I suspect, in the idea of ‘levels of explanation’. ? e 
idea is that within certain levels of explanation, we will fi nd a particular 
kind of intelligibility... [T]he lesson from Hume is that there is no more 
to causation than arbitrary connections between independent variables of 
cause and eff ect. We have to resist the demand for intelligibility. (Campbell 
2008, 201)
? is is not just a restatement of the recent pragmatic attitude that, in psychiatry, 
explanations may cross levels. Rather, the very idea of levels of explanation, where 
these are understood as characteristic forms of intelligibility, is itself undercut.
? is leaves, however, the issue of shedding some light on the nature of causal 
connections (if not a priori light on particular causal connections). In (non-mental) 
cases of causation, the notion of mechanism plays a central role in empirical research. 
Searching out the way in which causal infl uence is transmitted has been an important 
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part of scientifi c practice. ‘It would seem a kind of madness if someone were to 
acknowledge that there is a causal link, but propose that there may be no mechanism 
linking the two’ (Campbell 2009, 138). But if science has usefully explored the 
mechanisms that mediate causal infl uence, there must be some paradigmatic 
mechanisms that stand in need of no further explanation and the transmission of 
motion by impulse, in Hume’s billiard ball example, is one such prototype.
Nevertheless, the idea that there must be such a mechanism is a kind of synthetic 
a priori claim which, Campbell suggests, should be rejected in line with Hume’s 
argument. He adopts the interventionist model defended most extensively by James 
Woodward in Making 3 ings Happen according to which for X to be a cause of Y is 
for intervening on X to be away of intervening on Y (Woodward 2003). ? e rejection 
of the necessity of a mechanism and the adoption of an interventionist approach 
opens up the possibility of a causal connection – in accord with interventionism – 
but where there is no mechanism. In the case of psychiatry, however, the key issue is 
causation in the absence of a mental mechanism, whatever that is taken to be.
Just as we fi nd it natural to expect there to be a mechanism underpinning material 
causal connections – even if this assumption lacks any genuine a priori justifi cation 
– so Campbell also suggests that in the case of mental causation we expect there to 
be a rational connection between propositional attitudes. ? e rational link between 
two propositional attitudes is our paradigm of a mental causal mechanism. So if one 
hears someone explain that they believe that Tranmere Rovers won their most recent 
football match because they heard it on the BBC, which they take to be trustworthy, 
no further inquiry is needed as to why the beliefs about what they hear and trust 
cause the belief about the result. Again, however, whilst the idea that mental causation 
is underpinned by rational connections is natural and compelling, it lacks a priori 
justifi cation.
[T]here is an analogy between:
1 the idea that propositional attitude ascriptions depend on the ascription 
of rationality to the subject, and
2 the idea that all causal interactions between pieces of matter must be 
comprehensible in mechanistic terms.
Both ideas express an insight – that we fi nd it extremely puzzling when we 
encounter causal relations among propositional attitudes that are not broadly 
rational, just as we fi nd it extremely puzzling when we encounter causal 
interactions between physical objects that are not mechanistic, and that 
involve spooky ‘action-at-a-distance’. Both ideas express a natural impulse of 
philosophers – to elevate this kind of point into a kind of synthetic a priori 
demand that reason makes on the world. ? is impulse has to be resisted. 
(Campbell 2009, 142)
So in both cases there is a genuine insight. As a matter of custom and habit, we fi nd 
an absence of material mechanisms and an absence of rational connections between 
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mental states puzzling. But in both cases it is a characteristic philosophical error to 
promote this natural expectation into a justifi ed a priori claim that the world must 
respect. Mere custom and habit cannot rationally sustain any such demand on how 
the world must be.
? e rejection of the necessity for rational connections between causally related mental 
states looks to ease a central problem for the philosophy of psychiatry: explaining 
delusions. ? ere need be nothing genuinely mysterious about a causal connection 
which lacks a rational connection (the expected mental mechanism).
Suppose you believe:
1 that this man is stroking his chin, and
2 that this man believes you need to shave.
What is it for the fi rst belief to be a cause of the second? On the interventionist 
analysis, it is for the intervention on the fi rst belief to be a way of changing 
whether you have the second belief. So if some external force changed your 
belief that this man is stroking his chin, you would no longer believe that he 
believes you need to shave. ? ere is no appeal to rationality here, no appeals 
to mechanism. (Campbell 2009, 143)
? e causal connection between one state and another is underpinned in interventionist 
terms based on the idea that if intervening on the fi rst belief is a stable way of bringing 
about a change in the second then this is suffi  cient for there to be a causal connection 
between them.
Spelling this idea out involves a little more complexity, however. Given a scanner 
capable of yielding a complete microphysical description of the human body and a 
longitudinal study of schizophrenia in a population, Campbell suggests that it might 
be possible to form a disjunctive characterisation of the set of microphysical states 
that are nomically suffi  cient for schizophrenia. But that function from physical states 
to illness would lack any concise expression and would not be couched in terms of 
variables which could be aff ected by local processes. 
For propositional attitudes to count as causes of delusions, Campbell suggests two 
conditions have to be met. ? ere should be ‘systematic relations between cause 
variables and the subsequent delusion’ and there should be a correlation between a 
change of the cause and a change of the eff ect (Campbell 2009, 146). More generally 
for the causal explanation of mental states, the causal variables, which he calls ‘control 
variables’, should have large, specifi c and systematic correlations with their eff ects akin 
to the way the controls of a car systematically control its behaviour. ? ese conditions 
do not require a rational connection, however. To repeat Campbell’s phrase, there 
need be ‘no appeal to rationality here’.
? e classical philosophical approach has been to regard propositional 
attitudes as part of a ‘conceptual scheme’ that we bring to bear in describing 
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the ordinary world. ? is conceptual scheme is taken to have strong a priori 
constraints on its applicability. In particular, as we have seen, rationality 
is taken to be a norm with which the scheme has to comply... ? e appeal 
I have just been making to the notion of a control variable is intended to 
replace this invocation of rationality... [I]t is the fact that we have control 
variables, not the fact that we have rationality, which means that we are ‘at 
the right level’ to talk of beliefs and desires. (Campbell 2009, 147)
? e phrase ‘at the right level’ occurs in inverted commas to fl ag the fact that the 
notion of the right explanatory level has been undercut. Without a pre-Humean 
insistence on the intelligibility of causal relations there is no more to the notion of 
being at the right level than that there is a causal relation tracked through the idea of 
control variables.
With the idea of control variables replacing an a priori requirement for rationality 
in mental causation, psychiatric explanation of delusions is in principle in the same 
predicament as the explanation of any other belief. Causal explanation has been 
achieved once one has an understanding of the variables necessary for changing the 
delusional belief entertained. ? e apparently principled problem of attempting to 
fi t primary delusions into some sort of rational framework is replaced by a practical 
problem of charting the variables that aff ect them. But is that aim enough for 
psychiatry?
3. A continuing role for understanding?
As I have summarised above, Campbell’s approach to causal explanation within 
psychiatry has two aspects: the rejection of the synthetic a priori framework, which 
would impose a rational structure on the causal explanation of mental states including 
delusions, and an austere interventionist approach to causation itself. ? e argument 
against the synthetic a priori framework is Humean. ? ere is no reason to think 
that cause and eff ect stand in an intelligible, rather than a merely brute, relation. 
? us, although we tend to assume that the paradigm of mental causation is a rational 
connection between mental states – just as we tend to assume that the paradigm of 
material causation is the communication of motion by impulse – there is no reason 
that this must be so. It is a temptation we, as philosophers, should resist.
Whilst that might be the case as far as causation is concerned, it does not explain why 
the states invoked as control variables should count as mental states. ? is is not to say 
that it confl icts with or precludes that idea. Rather, the account of control variables 
– which according to Campbell replaces an appeal to rationality – is insuffi  cient to 
make that characterisation clear. Slimming the resources of explanation down merely 
to a causal interventionist account leaves the status of the mental mysterious. Whilst 
there are good reasons to hold that intelligibility is no part of the causal relation per se, 
there are good reasons, which fl ow from twentieth century criticisms of Cartesianism, 
to hold that it is part of what it is to be mental. Given that it is not a part of the 
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interventionist explanation of mental states itself, intelligibility is a necessary adjunct 
to that.
But it is one thing to reject the idea that minds might be essentially private and stress 
instead their necessary intelligibility, it is another to say something about what that 
intelligibility comprises. To say something about that is to sketch out the shape that 
a form of psychiatric understanding can take in addition to the austere conception 
of interventionist causal explanation that Campbell outlines (to adopt that familiar 
distinction). Like Jaspers’s aim, it is to sketch a continuing role for understanding in 
addition to, and despite recent developments in, the causal explanation of mental 
disorder. (But this is not to say that the schematic discussion of understanding that 
follows mirrors Jaspers’s own account of understanding, of phenomenology and 
empathy.)
? e most promising recent approach to shedding some light on the nature of such 
intelligibility has been to explore the connections between interpretation, mentality 
and rationality. On this approach, the interpretation of other minds presupposes that 
they fi t into a broadly rational pattern. ? e most infl uential version of this approach 
– Donald Davidson’s – bases the connection between mindedness and rationality 
on an explicit argument (Davidson 1980). ? e justifi cation of any ascription of 
mental states to another person is limited in principle to those available to a radical 
interpreter: i.e. someone interpreting from scratch without the help of resources such 
as dictionaries or bilingual speakers. Whilst this does not describe the less austere 
predicament of everyday interpreting, it is a rational reconstruction of all that could 
ultimately be off ered as justifi cation for any interpretation. 
Davidson argues, however, that the holism of beliefs and meanings presents a 
fundamental problem for interpretation. Only if one already knows the belief 
expressed in an utterance can one translate the utterance. And only if one can already 
translate the utterance can one determine the belief expressed. It is to break into this 
circle that Davidson invokes rationality. One must assume that beliefs are broadly 
true and rational: an assumption called ‘the Principle of Charity’. ? e assumption 
of rationality is thus an essential feature of understanding other minds. And, given 
that radical interpretation outlines in principle all the facts available to determine 
meaning and mental content, this implies that they are constitutively rational. Hence 
Davidson outlines an argument for the claim that understanding has a distinctive 
rational shape.
? ere are two main kinds of objection to Davidson’s argument that are relevant here. 
First, there are arguments that Charity is unnecessary for interpretation. Weaker 
principles such as the Principle of Humanity might do the job better. Second, it has 
been argued that psychiatric symptoms such as delusions are counter examples to the 
claim that the mental is constitutively rational (Bortolotti 2005). Before considering 
these objections, however, it will be helpful to clarify the role that rationality need 
play in shedding light on mindedness.
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One need not assume that rationality is supposed to shed light on the nature of mind 
and meaning from outside. If the connection between rationality and mentality were 
to provide an independent insight into the latter it would be necessary to have a 
characterisation independent of the intelligibility of minds in interpretation. (One 
indication of this aim in Davidson’s own thinking is his suggestion that truth can be 
used to shed light on meaning, inverting Tarski’s order of explanation (eg. Davidson 
1980, xiv). But an indication that he may not intend such an analysis is his later 
suggestion that the structure and content of truth itself is the pattern exemplifi ed in 
radical interpretation (Davidson 1990).)
But the connection between mindedness and rationality need not be made as an 
attempt to shed light on the former from an external position. Perhaps the best insight 
we can have into the nature of rationality is manifested in the pattern of intelligibility 
tracked in radical interpretation. 
? is approach is suggested by two further considerations. ? e fi rst is that the way 
that the rationality of the mental is exemplifi ed by the normativity of mental content 
and linguistic meaning itself. As Wittgenstein emphasises, mental states stand in 
prescriptive relations to the states and events that satisfy them whilst an understanding 
of meaning is an understanding of the correct application of words.
A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, 
a thought, what makes it true – even when that thing is not there at all! 
Whence this determining of what is not yet there? ? is despotic demand? 
(“? e hardness of the logical must.”) (Wittgenstein 1953, §437)
Such normative connections are intrinsic features of the mental, constituting states 
as the states they are, rather than an external way of explaining or characterising the 
mental from without. One of the key themes of the Philosophical Investigations is that 
no attempt to explain the normativity of the mental in other terms can succeed.
Normativity is also a feature of linguistic meaning, of, for example, Davidson’s 
recommended codifi cation of the output of radical interpretation: instances of the 
T-schema.
[W]hat makes it correct among speakers of English to make a claim with, 
say, the words ‘Snow is white’... is that snow is indeed white. I stress ‘correct’: 
truth in the sense of disquotability... is unproblematically normative for 
the practice of using the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side of 
T-sentences... (McDowell 2009, 214)
Such instances display the normativity of linguistic meaning and thus partially 
exemplify the rationality Davidson invokes in radical interpretation. But, again, 
there is no need to assume that their normativity can be cashed out in non- or pre-
linguistic terms.
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On the Tarskian-Davidsonian conception the ‘oughts’ in question – the 
‘oughts’ that are built into the idea of, say, denotation – are not separable 
from the idea of correctness in assertion... I think once we see that the 
intuition that meaning and aboutness are ‘ought’-laden does not require the 
relevant ‘oughts’ to be pre-semantical... we can see that there is no ground 
for the idea that linguistic behaviour must be governed by... proprieties that 
can be formulated in non-semantical terms... (McDowell 2009, 215-6)
? e second consideration to support the claim that the connection between 
mindedness and rationality need not be made as an attempt to shed light on the 
former from an external position stems from consideration of interpretation of the 
speech and action. According to the approach I am considering, the paradigmatic 
pattern of such interpretation is manifestly diff erent from the explanation of other 
natural phenomena by, for example, subsumption under laws. (To be merely broadly 
Davidsonian it is not necessary to insist that all action explanation implicitly relies on 
a practical syllogism pairing beliefs and desires.)
Both involve placing things in a pattern. But in one case the pattern is 
constituted by regularities according to which phenomena of the relevant 
kind unfold; in the other it is the pattern of a life led by an agent who 
can shape her action and thought in the light of an ideal of rationality. 
(McDowell 2009, 211)
? e ideal of rationality appealed to here is one appropriate to the ‘pattern of a life 
led by an agent’. ? ere is an important contrast with the idea of subsumption under 
a regularity, of what generally happens. Instead, the interpretation turns on the 
normative idea of what is right for agent. But again, there is no need for this point 
to imply that the rationality implicit in interpretation of speech and action can be 
unpacked in terms independent of intelligible connections between mental states, 
utterances and actions.
So it is possible to take a broadly Davidsonian approach, which places a rational 
structuring at the centre of understanding speech and action, without committing 
oneself to an independent characterisation of rationality. If so the dispute about the 
rival claims of the principles of Charity and Humanity is not relevant here. Without 
the assumption that the description of the presuppositions of radical interpretation are 
supposed to shed light on mindedness as from outside, little hangs on the distinction 
between them.
What of the objection that delusions are counter examples to the claim that the 
mental is constitutively rational? In rejecting the role of synthetic a priori claims about 
intelligibility, Campbell mentions and dismisses Davidson’s approach on the grounds 
that delusions look to be mental states but do not readily fi t into a rational structure. 
As Campbell says, it ‘stretch[es] credulity that the fi gure of the schizophrenic could 
be used to explain what Davidson meant by “rational”’ (Campbell 2009, 141; cf 
Bortolotti 2005).
EuJAP  |  VOL. 6  |  No. 1 |  2010
105
? is point does indeed present a diffi  culty for any approach which assumes that 
rationality is key to intelligibility and that intelligibility is of the essence of the 
mental. Nevertheless, just as hard cases make for bad laws, the problem of interpreting 
delusions is not reason enough to give up an interpretation-based approach to the 
mind as a whole, not least because making sense of the content of delusions can be 
a clinical as well as a philosophical problem. (? us any philosophical account which 
failed to save that phenomenon – the clinical diffi  culty – would be undermined rather 
than reinforced by that fact.) So the fact that subjects of schizophrenic delusions, or 
perhaps the delusions themselves, are far from paradigmatic instances of rationality – 
and thus would not be used to teach the meaning of ‘rationality’ – need not undermine 
the central thesis. In the next section I will try to say something more about this.
4. Understanding applied to delusions
To outline the general strategy I commend, I will briefl y consider a recent criticism 
of the idea that understanding must have a rational shape made by Lisa Bortolotti 
(Bortolotti 2005). She outlines two broadly Davidsonian strategies for accommodating 
delusions within a rational framework. One is to concede that delusions are irrational 
in a diff erent (more dramatic) way than other beliefs and thus to deny that they are 
beliefs at all. ? e second is to argue that delusions are beliefs and are irrational in 
the same way in which other beliefs can be: amenable to revision and correction. 
She then outlines objections to both strategies. ? e problem with the fi rst move is 
that delusions behave like beliefs (for example, they guide action). ? e problem with 
the second move is that delusions are not as easy to revise and correct as she suggests 
broadly rationalist approaches require. So, the puzzle with monothematic delusions 
is that they behave like beliefs but are not largely rational on what she takes to be 
the most charitable approach to that idea. It is the second argument I will consider 
here.
Bortolotti targets what she calls the ‘Background Argument’ which assumes 
that occasional and local breakdowns of rationality can only be accommodated 
within an ascription of mindedness if there is a background of rationality. 
[O]nly within a belief system that is largely rational can intentional description 
occasionally be granted to representational states that fail to meet the standards of 
rationality’ (Bortolotti 2005, 189). She goes on to characterise the rational constraints 
on interpretation that the Background Argument imposes more specifi cally:
? ere are two main requirements that a creature A must satisfy in order to 
count as a believer: (1) A cannot explicitly violate a fundamental norm of 
rationality and (2) A cannot fail to recover from a violation of a norm of 
rationality once this violation is made explicit to A. ? is capacity to restore 
rationality, together with the general conformity of the creature’s behaviour 
to the standards of rationality, is regarded as suffi  cient for some version of 
RC [the rationality constraint] to be in place. (Bortolotti 2005, 190)
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Her prima facie case is then that monothematic delusions such as Capgras do not meet 
this modest remaining condition. Two arguments for this conclusion are contained in 
the following lengthy passage.
? e only reading of [the Background Argument] BA that would make it 
true that monothematic and circumscribed delusions can be intentionally 
characterised is the reading according to which a belief system is largely 
rational if most of the beliefs it contains are rational. ? is reading lacks 
the resources to discriminate between the behaviour of believers who can 
recover from failures of rationality and those who cannot, a distinction 
that plays a very important role in Davidson’s characterisation of BA. ? e 
simplistic reading cannot therefore be the best available reading of BA. It is 
not consistent for the Davidsonian to illustrate the role of BA by appealing to 
the phenomenon of recovery and to endorse the view that deluded subjects 
are largely rational. For Davidson, it is a condition on believers that, after 
‘Socratic tutoring’, they recover from deviations from rationality. Deluded 
subjects typically don’t. 
? ere is a further reason why I believe it is not in the spirit of BA to 
consider the behaviour of people aff ected by relatively circumscribed and 
monothematic delusions as largely rational. ? e idea behind BA is that 
the non-rational belief can be made sense of only by appealing to the 
other true and sensible beliefs the subject has. ? at a false belief can be 
explained by appealing to the other true and justifi ed beliefs that belong to 
the same system, is often true... ? e same strategy cannot be easily applied 
to delusional states. Which true belief of Bob will help us rationalise his 
conviction that the person who looks identical to his mother is actually an 
alien? (Bortolotti 2005, 203-4)
? e fi rst argument turns on the fact that suff erers of monothematic delusions diff er 
from people who make specifi c logical errors. ? e latter typically can be taught to 
recognise and correct their beliefs whereas as the former typically hold onto their 
delusional beliefs come what may. So if the claim that subjects must be largely rational 
is defended for the case of logical errors through the notion of recognition of error 
and self-correction, that cannot help in the case of delusions. Second, the assumption 
of rationality is typically reconciled to a subject holding some false beliefs through 
an explanation using true beliefs but that cannot help in the case of monothematic 
delusions. 
? e quick response to both these arguments is to concede that the methods that 
reconcile an assumption of necessary rationality with logical and other non-
psychopathological errors will not apply in the case of some delusions, at least. ? at 
fact is taken by Bortolotti to undermine the rationalist approach to mentality. But it 
need not. Since monothematic delusions are pre-philosophically genuinely puzzling 
whilst logical errors are not pre-philosophically puzzling it would count against an 
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account of understanding if it were to produce the same results in both cases. (So 
this response claims that the sophisticated reading of the Background Argument, 
according to which rationality requires agents to amend and correct errors to count 
as agents at all, is too strict. ? e slow response requires a painstaking approach to each 
individual case to see what rational relations hold, and what do not, without overly 
prejudging the shape that will take.)
Take the case of Bob who supposedly believes that the person who lives in his house 
and looks identical to his mother is not his mother but a cleverly disguised Martian. 
How seriously should we take this belief ascription (helpfully provided by Bortolotti)? 
? e problem is this. Bob does not have the supporting beliefs that we would have were 
we to believe that someone – almost incredibly under any circumstances – had been 
replaced by a cleverly disguised Martian. Given that, then the ascription of beliefs to 
him comes under (pre-philosophical) strain. Does he really believe that the imposter 
is a Martian or just an alien called for convenience in his idiolect a ‘Martian’? What 
supporting discriminating beliefs does he have about the solar system? To the extent 
to which these questions can be answered then the assumption of rationality looks 
to be the best tool to chart his conception. But that is not to say that these questions 
can be answered. ? at is the puzzle of delusions and the reason Jaspers called them 
‘un-understandable’.
To what extent, then, can one bring understanding successfully to bear on delusions? 
I think that this is a genuine challenge for both psychiatry and philosophy of 
psychiatry alike and will not attempt a general answer to that question here. But 
even within an approach that takes rationality to be central to mindedness there are 
more ways to attempt to gain some understanding than at fi rst appear. ? e clue to 
one such approach is to be found in some of Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning 
and understanding in cases which do not fi t within the domain of everyday shared 
practices or uses.
First, it is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of both platonism and constructionism about 
meaning. Wittgenstein opposes a notion of meaning that severs all connection to 
our meaning-laden reactions and instead assumes platonic rails leading to infi nity. 
? us, by extension, he opposes a picture in which one can begin to gesture towards 
other meaning-driven ways of going on, of which, however, we can make nothing – 
cannot understand or follow – but can still think of, from a detached philosophical 
perspective at least, as norm- or meaning-driven (cf Lear 1982, 1984, 1986).
At the same time we should not react to this rejection by adopting a view of meaning 
in which we simply make things up as we go along. We should not think of meaning 
as a matter of piecemeal construction since that undermines its necessary normativity 
(contra Kripke 1982, Wright 1986). ? e familiar connection of meaning and practice 
need not be taken to reduce meaning to a notion of practice that could be understood 
in non-normative, non-meaning-related terms.
Notwithstanding the rejection of platonism – and thus the rejection of the idea, at least, 
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of other ways of going on – this does not imply that where rational interpretation fails 
we must have fully left the domain of meaning and our meaning-related reactions. 
It is possible to maintain the rejection of platonism but still have a more pluralistic 
response to its absence.
A useful approach is to think about an ‘intransitive’ notion of meaning. We can 
think of this on the basis of what Wittgenstein says in passages of the Brown Book in 
which he criticises a constitutive theory of meaning and distinguishes transitive and 
intransitive uses of ‘particular’ in order to criticise the idea that meaning something 
consists in a ‘particular’ experience. (Nothing hangs on the potentially misleading use 
of the word ‘delusion’ here.)
Now the use of the word “particular” is apt to produce a kind of delusion 
and roughly speaking this delusion is produced by the double usage of this 
word. On the one hand, we may say, it is used preliminary to a specifi cation, 
description, comparison; on the other hand, as what one might describe as 
an emphasis. ? e fi rst usage I shall call the transitive one, the second the 
intransitive one. ? us, on the one hand I say “? is face gives me a particular 
impression which I can’t describe”. ? e latter sentence may mean something 
like: “? is face gives me a strong impression”. (Wittgenstein 1958, 158)
? e intransitive notion of meaning looks to be in play in a passage in which 
Wittgenstein compares musical and semantic understanding such as:
Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in 
music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a sentence 
lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a 
musical theme. Why is just this the pattern of variation in loudness and 
tempo? One would like to say “Because I know what it’s all about.” But 
what is it all about? I should not be able to say. In order to ‘explain’ I could 
only compare it with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean 
the same pattern). (One says “Don’t you see, this is as if a conclusion were 
being drawn” or “? is is as it were a parenthesis”, etc. How does one justify 
such comparisons?--? ere are very diff erent kinds of justifi cation here.)
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be 
replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it 
cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be 
replaced by another.)
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to 
diff erent sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these 
words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.)
? en has “understanding” two diff erent meanings here?--I would rather say 
that these kinds of use of “understanding” make up its meaning, make up 
my concept of understanding. (Wittgenstein 1953 §§ 527, 531, 532)
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? ese passages suggest that in addition to the everyday sense of meaning which applies 
to learning and using sentences to frame, for example, empirical judgements there is 
a further variant notion of meaning shorn of the connection to meaning something. 
(Cf. ‘[I]f, recognizing this, I resign myself to saying “It just expresses a musical 
thought”, this would mean no more than saying “It expresses itself ”‘ (Wittgenstein 
1958, 166).) If so, how might this help with understanding psychopathology?
A recurring theme in the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough is Wittgenstein’s criticism 
of Frazer’s method of shedding light on the alien cultural practices by looking for 
underlying causes (such as quasi-scientifi c attempts to intervene in nature through 
rain dances) (Wittgenstein 1978). To a fi rst approximation, Wittgenstein suggests 
instead that the meaning of cultural practices lies open to view (for those, at least, 
with eyes to see). One comparison he uses is to remind us of our habit of kissing a 
picture of one’s beloved. ? is is not the means to any distinct end. Nor does it encode 
a particular thought. It is however, nevertheless, an aspect of symbolic use. A helpful 
suggestion made by Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock is that, they suggest, we are not 
supposed by Wittgenstein to fi nd our own habit here unsurprising (Hutchinson, 
Read and Sharrock 2008, 47). Although this is what we do, still, on refl ection, it 
is strange. ? us the comparison between the practices described by Frazer and our 
own habits does not so much provide a route to domesticate the former as show how 
we can begin to approach them with some degree of understanding without fi nding 
them ordinary.
? e idea of intransitive meaning together with Wittgenstein’s sketch of an alternative 
to Frazer’s approach to alien rituals and practices suggests the beginnings of a way to 
deploy understanding in the face of delusions. On Frazer’s own approach, the rituals 
described in one way mean something else. A dance that, we know, cannot have any 
eff ects on the weather, is nevertheless attempted for that reason. ? at is the kind of 
act it, intentionally, is. ? is style of interpretation is akin to Bortolotti’s account of 
the Background Argument which, as she emphasises, is an implausible interpretation 
of monothematic delusions. (? us Frazer’s approach is an unpromising approach to 
monothematic delusions.) On Wittgenstein’s approach, by contrast, we can come 
to an understanding of the rituals (albeit by a potentially painful process of self-
transformation) in their own terms and without seeing them as the proper subjects 
for self-correction. ? us they lie outside the scope of the Background Argument. 
Nevertheless this is still a form of understanding even if not a form of translation into 
our practices. It takes place against a background of rational interpretation, of fi nding 
order in much of what the others say and do, even though it itself resists assimilation. 
Such understanding goes beyond the resources of merely causal explanation.
? is is not to say that all or even any expressions of monothematic delusions are 
instances of intransitive meaning. My purpose is more modest but more general: to 
suggest that there can be space for a form of understanding, for interpretative work to 
be done, even when, as in the case of delusions, there are genuine pre-philosophical 
diffi  culties.
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5. Conclusions
Jaspers argued that there was a particular need within psychiatry for understanding 
as well as explanation. ? at distinction has fallen from favour (both in thinking 
about psychiatry and within the philosophy of science more generally). Within 
the philosophy of psychiatry, a duality of explanation and understanding has been 
replaced by a variety of explanatory levels or approaches combined with a pragmatic 
attitude to their application. Explanation trading across levels is the expectation. 
Very recently, John Campbell has suggested that the very idea of explanatory levels 
is a hangover from a pre-Humean view of causation which assumes that causal 
connections should have a degree of intelligibility (above brute causal connectedness). 
Campbell argues against any synthetic a priori assumptions of intelligibility of nature 
and for an austere interventionist model of causal explanation. In particular, this 
suggests a route for approaching delusions which can sidestep worries about their 
lack of rationality.
Despite the attractions of the interventionist view of causation, however, a psychiatry 
based solely on Campbell’s suggestion lacks the resources for making the assumption 
that psychopathological experiences are still mental unmysterious. I have suggested 
that this is the role for understanding, in addition to explanation, in psychiatry. 
Furthermore, such understanding should assume the rationality of the phenomena 
it approaches without assuming that rationality can be characterised in terms 
independent of belief and meaning. ? e fact that delusions present a genuine challenge 
for a philosophically motivated approach to understanding does not undermine such 
an approach. Delusions present the genuine clinical puzzles that must challenge any 
model of understanding.
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